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A MODEL OF RESEARCH, PATENTING,
AND PRODUCTiVITY GROWI'H
ABSTRACT
I use the aggregate behavior of three indicators of technology (employment of research
scientists and engineers, patented inventions, and total factor productivity) to identify a plausible
model of endogenous technological change. In the US (as well as in other developed countries)
research employment and total factor productivity have both grown, while the rate of patenting
has remained relatively flat. One interpretation of these facts is that: (i) patentable inventions
are becoming increasingly difficult to discover as the quality of techniques in use increases, (ii)
inventions which are patented represent percentage improvements on techniques currently in use,
and (iii) the size of the economy is growing, making patents increasingly valuable and justifying
increased research efforts devoted to discovering them. This paper presents a general equilibrium
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and NBER1 Introduction
There are three widely available indicators of technological change: (i) measures
of research input, such as employment of research scientists and engineers, (ii)
measures of inventive output, in particular counts of patented inventions, and (iii)
measures of the improvement in technologies in use, such as total factor produc-
tivity growth. These indicators, if taken seriously, are quite informative as to
which models are capable of organizing our empirical understanding of technolog-
ical change. I propose a model which, in a steady state equilibrium, replicates
the observed aggregate trends in research, patenting, and productivity. These
aggregate implications follow from a stochastic model of research, patenting,and
productivity growth at the level of individual products.
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of the three technology indicators in the US
over the past three decades (see table 2 for data sources). For easeof comparison,
the three series are indexed at zero (on a log scale) in 1957. On the one hand, em-
ployment of research and development scientists and engineers in industry (S&E's)
has grown dramatically. Moreover, the level of total factor productivity (TFP)
in the manufacturing sector has grown more slowly, yet it does display a persis-
tent upward trend. On the other hand, the annual number ofsuccessful domestic
patent applications has displayed little upwardtrend relative to its fluctuations.
My interpretation of the evidence is that, while S&E's andTFP have grown, the
level of patenting has fluctuated around a constant level.1
'I associate domestic patents with US priority patents: inventions for which patent protection
is sought first in the US. The patent data would display a distinct upward trendif I had counted
all patents granted in the US, since foreign patenting in the US has expanded rapidly.There is
some basis for ignoring foreign patents. For the most part, US priority patentsare the result
1My interpretation of the trends in the three technology indicators is supported
by data from other time periods and from other countries. As for the constancy
of patenting: (i) Griliches (1990) shows that domestic patent applications in the
US display little trend since the 1920's and (ii) Eaton and Kortum (1993) find
no trend between 1952 and 1990 in the annual number of patents granted do-
mestically to residents of France, Germany, UK, and the US. Only Japan, of the
countries studied, has experienced a noticeable increase in domestic patenting. As
for relative trends in research and patenting: (i) Evenson (1984) has documented
a dramatic decline in patenting relative to measures of research for a broad set of
countries and (ii) Kortum (1993a) finds that all the US manufacturing industries
for which data are available have experienced a decline in patenting per unit of
real R&D. Apparently, the aggregate decline in patenting relative to R&D is not
simply a result of R&D being performed increasingly in industries (such as Office
and Computing Equipment) where we suspect inventions are relatively unlikely to
be patented. As for the trends in research and productivity: Jones (1993) docu-
ments the rapid growth of research inputs and the relatively constant growth of
TFP over the past 25 years in France, Germany, Japan, and the US.
The trends in the three indicators of technology present puzzles for several
existing models. A standard assumption in the endogenous technological change
literature [Judd (1985), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Grossman and Helpman
(1991)] is that inventive output is proportional to the quantity of labor allocated
of research performed in the US while foreign patents are not. On the other hand, foreign
patents may indicate the arrival of productivity improving techniques from abroad [see, Eaton
and Kortum (1993)]. The model in the current paper applies to an economy that obtains all its
technological advances from its own research.
2to research. In Romer (1990), the rate at which a researcher invents new types of
goods actually increases over time as a result of a research spillover. If the trend
in patents says anything about the rate of invention, the ubiquitous decline in
patenting per S&E argues against such formulations. Puzzles remain if we ignore
patenting and look directly at the relationship between S&E's and TFP. The same
models of endogenous technological change imply that TFP growth is proportional
to employment in research. Jones (1993) points out that while research employ-
ment has grown dramatically, TFP growth has not increased as the theories would
suggest. Finally, the empirical literature, quantifying the effect of research on pro-
ductivity, generally posits a linear relationship between productivity growth and
the growth of a stock of knowledge. If the stock of previous patents is used to mea-
sure the stock of knowledge, then the relative constancy ofthe rate of patenting
implies that the stock of knowledge grows at an ever declining rate. AsGriliches
(1990) notes, the prediction of continuously declining rates of productivity growth
has not been observed.
None of these phenomena is a puzzle in the context of the model I construct
below. The primitive of the model is a set of distributions from which researchers
draw techniques for producing higher quality goods. A technique, once discovered,
can be used indefinitely, hence the technical capabilityof the economy is non
decreasing over time. However, the distributions of undiscovered techniquesdo
not evolve over time. Hence, as the quality of existing techniques improves, more
research effort (more time drawing from the distributions) is required tofind a
patentable technique, i.e. one that is better than existing techniques.The model
implies that a constantly growing quantity of research input is requiredto generate
a constant flow of new patents. This explains why weobserve a constant rate of
3patenting while the employment of S&E's has risen over time.
To account for constant exponential productivity growth, it must be that the
average quality of techniques in use rises at a constant rate. Assume that a fixed
percentage of the improvements in technique is patented. Since the rate of patent-
ing is constant, it must be that a patented technique is, on average, a constant
percentage improvement on some technique currently in use. This requirement
on the average 'size' of a patent can be used to prove that the underlying distri-
butions of undiscovered techniques are from the Pareto family. Given the Pareto
restriction, the model implies that productivity growth is proportional to the rate
of patenting, which is in turn proportional to the growth in the stock of past re-
search. Thus, a growing path of research input is consistent with a constant rate
of patenting as well as a constant rate of productivity growth.
To close the model, I show that if the population of individuals or the stock of
human capita] in the economy grows at a constant rat.e, then there is an equilibrium
in which a constant fraction of these human resources are devoted to research.
Though a researcher is increasingly unlikely to discover a patentable invention,
the average value of a patentable invention rises over time. Patentable inventions
become more valuable because, in a growing economy, new techniques will be
used to produce an ever greater quantity of goods. In equilibrium the value of
patents increases at the same rate as the cost of discovering them. This supports
an equilibrium with a growing level of research investment.
Having developed a model consistent with the trends, I investigate whether it
can account for the observed fraction of human resources devoted to research. I
measure this fraction as nominal R&D expenditure (compensation of researchers)
divided by nominal compensation of the labor force. I set the parameters of the
4model to mimic the growth of S&E's and TFP. I find that for moderate rates of
discounting, the model overpredicts the R&D share. Next, I ignore productivity
growth and fix one of the parameters to mimic econometric estimates of the elas-
ticity of productivity with respect to the stock of research. In this case I am able
to fit the R&D share given a reasonable discount rate. But, as with the empirical
literature on research and productivity, these parameters imply that industrial
research accounts for only 10-20% of observed productivity growth.
2 Relation to the Existing Literature
How does my explanation of the behavior of S&E's, TFP, and patenting relate to
other arguments in the literature? On the observed fall in patenting relative to
S&E's, Kortum (1993a) assesses three explanations: (a) opportunities for discov-
ering patentable inventions have declined, (b) the value of patentable inventions
has increased, making researchers willing to expend more effort to get one, and
(c) the fraction of inventions that are patented has declined. He concludes, inthe
context of a theoretical model that differs from the present model, that explana-
tion (c) must be part of the story. Griliches (1990) proposes institutional reasons
why the fraction of inventions that are patented may be declining.The present
model, on the other hand, assumes that the propensity to patent is constantand
explains the observed decline in patenting relative to S&E's by acombination
of explanations (a) and (b). The increasing difficulty of discovering patentable
inventions is driven by the same search mechanism proposed by Evenson (1984,
1991). The value of patented inventions also rises over time,thus explaining why
research activity continues to grow in this environment of declining opportunities.
5What should we conclude about a possible decline in the propensity to patent?
The direct evidence we have, based on responses from R&D managers, Mansfield
(1986), and Henderson and Cockburn (1994), does not support the view that the
propensity to patent has declined. Nonetheless, further research needs to be done
before we can be certain that explanation (c) is unimportant.
On the behavior of productivity relative to patenting and S&E's, my account is
consistent with a number of previous works. In interpreting the trends in patenting
and productivity, Griliches (1990, pg. 1698) observes that a constant flow of
patenting could yield constant exponential productivity growth if patents are on
average percentage improvements. Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and
Helpman (1991), and Caballero and Jaffe (1993) develop theoretical models that
are consistent with this interpretation of the size of patents. In studying time series
of productivity and S&E's, Jones (1993) concludes that the level of productivity
has a negative effect on productivity growth conditional on S&E's. When he
incorporates this phenomenon into a model of growth, he finds that population
growth is needed to support a steady state with endogenous technological change.
These features are also present in a model of endogenous technological change
developed by Nordhaus (1969). Similarly, in my model, exponential growth of
population or human capital is necessary if the value of patents (and research
activity) is to grow in steady state.
Caballero and Jaffe (1993) have recently made an ambitious attempt to assess
the empirical content of research-driven models of endogenous growth. They put
particular emphasis on modeling and measuring technological spillovers. Using
data on patent citations, they estimate that there has been a secular decline in
the knowledge spillovers generated by successive cohorts of patents. They note
6that this is a potential explanation of the observed fall in the patent-R&D ratio.
While this is a provocative finding, Caballero and Jaffe's theoretical model does
not provide an interpretation for it. In particular, their model implies that the
patent-S&E ratio is constant in steady state.
The technological spillovers emphasized by Caballero and Jaffe are totally ab-
sent in the present model. This absence reflects an attempt to keep the model sim-
ple rather than an a priori belief that spillovers are unimportant. In the present
model, with no spillovers, there is too much research in equilibrium relative to
what a social planner would choose.2 It is quite likely that this over investment
result would be reversed by introducing technological spillovers. A natural way
to introduce spillovers is to allow research successes to create general knowledge
which shifts the underlying distributions of undiscovered techniques. I leave this
as a topic for future research. One challenge will be to introduce research spillovers
while maintaining aggregate predictions that are consistent with the data.
The stucture of the theoretical model developed below borrows extensively
from existing literature. I start with Evenson and Kislev's (1976) search model
of technological change whose implications for patenting are derived in Kortum
(1991). Next, I follow Bental and Peled (1992) by assuming thatthe search dis-
tributions are Pareto. Finally, I embed the search model in a general equilibrium
framework styled after Grossman and Helpman's (1991, chapt 4) model of rising
product quality.3
2!havenot proven this, however it is true for a wide range of parameter values. This result is
not causedby racing behavior.Rather, it is a general equilibrium effect. Too many individuals
enter the research sector because, due to imperfect competition, they are paidless than their
marginal product in the production sector.
3The search model of patenting does not fit as naturally into a model of expanding variety
7The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section I describe the economic
environment underlying the model. Next, I solve the model: first, deriving the
behavior of patenting conditional on research, second, deriving the behavior of
productivity growth conditional on patenting, and finally, solving for an equilib-
rium path of research. In the fourth section I compare the predictions of the model
with measures of technological change in the US. I focus on the prediction of the
model for the fraction of human resources devoted to research. The fourth section
contains concluding remarks and a look at how the model helps us interpret firm
level data on research and productivity growth. The appendices contain a table
of notation as well as the more tedious mathematical derivations.
3 The Model
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals and a continuum of varieties
of goods. Labor is the only input to production. At each moment, each individual
chooses to sell its labor or to search for a technique to produce a higher quality
good, i.e., an individual can be a laborer or a researcher. A researcher's success
is determined by the qualities of existing goods and the probability distributions
over the qualities of new ideas. A successful researcher gets an idea for producing
a higher quality good, obtains a patent, and hires labor to produce the good. I
focus on the relation between research activity, the arrival of new patented goods,
and the resulting improvements in product quality, which I relate to productivity
growth.
such as Judd (1985) Romer (1990),orGrossman and He)pman (1991, chapt 3).
83.1 Research and Patents
During an instant, dt, an individual engaged in research will have an idea with
probability dt. An ideals defined to be knowledge of how to produce a consumption
good of variety jandquality Q.Thevariety is drawn from the uniform density
on [0, J].4 The quality, conditional on variety j,isdrawn from the cumulative
distribution function, F(q) = Pr[Q <q]. 1 assume F is continuously differentiable
with density f(q).5
I assume that an idea is patentable if and only if its quality exceeds that of
all previous patents on variety j.Thelaw is somewhat more complicated than
this, "Under section 102, a patent is barred for lack of novelty if there is enough
in the prior art to enable someone skilled in the area to perform the process or
produce the product described in the patent application." (Miller and Davis, 1990,
pg. 46). However, in a world where goods have only one quality dimension,it is
4Having a continuum of goods allows me to model research as a random process while treating
aggregate outcomes as deterministic. This modeling device greatly simplifies the analysis, as does
the assumption that the set of varieties is fixed. By assuming that the variety is drawn from the
uniform distribution, I have made it impossible for researchers to focus their search on specific
varieties. This strong assumption lets me avoid two difficult issues. First, a researcher owning a
patent on a given variety may attempt to prevent entry by continuing to search in that variety
[see, Reinganum (1989) for a general discussion of this issue]. Second, a researcher may want to
direct her research at varieties in which little technological progress has been made in the past.
These are both important issues which I would like to address with future incarnations of the
model.
5The assumption of a Poisson process guarantees that ideas arrive sequentially rather than
simultaneously. The assumption of a continuously differentiable density allows me to ignore the
possibility of two ideas having exactly the same quality. Both assumption help to simplifythe
later analysis.
9natural to define the prior art as the quality of the previous best idea. Thus, to
be patentable, a new idea must surpass the prior art and set a quality standard
which becomes the new state of the art. I assume that patenting is costless so
that all patentable ideas are patented. I also assume that patent examiners only
grant patents on patentable ideas.6.
Research activity generates an expanding set of patented goods. Let N(j, i)
bethe number of patents on variety jpriorto time i. To guarantee that there is
always at least one good available in each variety, 1 assume that there is always
an unpatented good (good 0). The entire set of goods at time i is therefore,
G(L){(i,j)i E {O,l,.. .,N(j,i)),jE [0,)]).
Each good, (i,j)G(i), has an associated quality, Q(i,j) > 0. The following spec-
ification of patent protection justifies keeping track of only the initial unpatented
good along with all subsequent patented goods.
Each patent is owned by the individual who had the idea. The patent holder
can produce a good using the patented idea and can costlessly prevent others from
infringing on the patent. Patent (i,j) is infringed if an individual, other than the
owner of the patent, produces the jth variety with quality QE(Q(i—1,j),Q(i,j)].7
Patent protection is assumed to last forever, though I show later that patent (i,j)
obtains no value from this protection once patent (i + 1,j) is discovered. The
original unpatented goods, (0,j), for jE[0,)], can be produced by any individual
without causing an infringement.
'These issues are discussed more thoroughly in Kortum (1991)
7Thi, way of specifying the scope of patent protection wu suggested to me by Nobuhiro
Kiyotaki.
103.2 Production
All goods are produced under constant returns to scale. In particular, to produce a
good at rate x requires labor services at rate cx, where c is a cost parameter.8 The
producer sets a price, P, at which to sell output to other individuals and hires labor
to meet demand at that price. Prices are in labor units and the wage is normalized
to be unity. The flow profits from patent (i,j) are thus, C(i,j,t)[P(i,j,i) —c],
where C(i,j,i) is the quantity demanded of good (i,j).
3.3 Preferences
A continuum of infinitely lived individuals is indexed by h E [O,e'], where n> 0 is
the rate of population growth. Each individual is endowed with a unit flow of labor
services which it allocates to research, R(h,i) =1,or production, R(h,i) =
Besideswage income of 1 —R(h,t),an individual may get profit income from
patents if she has been a successful researcher in the past.
An individual's objective is allocate her labor between research and production
and to allocate her consumption across varieties and qualities so as to maximize
the expected present discounted value of instantaneous utility,
Et[j e'tU(s)ds],
'For ease of exposition,! interpret technological change as quality improvement and normalize
costs of production to be constant. It is easy to show that technological change can also be
interpreted as reductions in labor requirements (with qualities unchanged over time). In this
alternative interpretation, the behavior of prices (though not price per unit of quality) will be
altered in an obvious way.
9Alternatively, imagine a fixed measure of individuals, each of whose endowment of labor
services grows at rate n due to exogenous accumulation of human capital. If n =0,the ecoaomy
reaches a steady state where no one chooses research and productivity ceases to grow.
11where p is the individual's discount rate. 1 assume that instantaneous utility
is homogeneous of degree one in the set of goods, G(t), so that individuals are
indifferent to the risk inherent in research. I also choose a convenient functional
form which implies that individuals will spread their income evenly across all
varieties, jN(j,t)
U(i) = exp{J1 /ln[(Q(i,j)e'C(i,j,i))]dj).
A representative individual obtains utility from quality weighted levels of per
capita consumption of the individual goods. With identical preferences that are
homogeneous of degree 1, facing the same set of prices, {P(i,j,i)(i,j)G(i)},
at a point in time each individual will purchase the same basket of goods, scaled
up or down according to her income.'0
3.4 The Evolving Set of Goods
The aggregate level of research activity in the economy at time I is given by the
measure of individuals engaged in research at that time, R(I)f0" R(h,i)dh.
A path of research {R(s)Is ￿ 2) will determine, probabilistically, future sets of
patented goods and their associated qualities. Much of the section 3 will be con-
cerned with describing exactly how the set of patented goods evolves over time. At









Lettingtend to zero shows that an individual with no income, e.g. an unsuccessful researcher,
will obtain instantaneous utility of zero by consuming nothing.
12expectations taking as given the equilibrium path of research and the implied
process for the arrival of new and better goods.
3.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy in period i is a path of research, {R(s)js ￿ i},
a consumption allocation, {C(i,j,i)(i,j) E G(s),s ￿ i) and a set of prices,
{P(i,j,s)I(i,j)G(s),st), such that in all periods s ￿ t: (a) The consump-
tion allocation is utility maximizing given prices; (b) Each price is profit maxi-
mizing for the producer given the prices set by others and the demand schedule
for the good (prices are the outcome of Bertrand competition); (c) Each individ-
ual's labor allocation maximizes expected utility; (d) The labor market clears: i.e.
f' C(i,j,s)dj=[e"
—R(s)]/cin all periods, $
4A Solution
The model specified in the previous section is solved in three steps. First, I derive
the patent production function: the equation relating the aggregate rate of patent-
ing to aggregate research input. Second, I derive the productivity equation:the
equation relating aggregate productivity growth to the aggregate rateof patent-
ing. Finally, I close the model by solving for an equilibrium pathof aggregate
research. The result is a set of equations for the rate of patenting, the rate of
growth of productivity, the rate of growth of research inputs,and the fraction of
human resources devoted to research as functions of the parameters of the model.
In solving the model, I impose restrictions on the representative search distri-
bution, F(q). While these restrictions are required for analytical tractability,they
13are also required if the model is to predict correctly the trends in patenting and
productivity growth. This is not true for the patent production function which I
derive without restricting the search distribution. Any continuously differentiable
search distribution is consistent with the observation that research inputs grow
exponentially while the rate of patenting is constant. However, the shape of the
search distribution is relevant to the form of the productivity equation. Only a
Pareto search distribution is consistent with the observation that a constant rate
of patenting produces exponential growth of productivity. Thus, I assume that the
representative search distribution is Pareto for the remainder of the paper (except
in the derivation of the patent production function). The analytical convenience
of the Pareto distribution makes it possible to solve explicitly for the equilibrium
level of research.
4.1 The Patent Production Function
The model has a striking implication for the aggregate output of patented ideas
conditional on a path of research. Let 1T(t)bethe rate of patenting, R(t) the
rate of research, and 1u(1)J'j R(s)ds the stock of past research. The model
implies,
=R(i)p(i)'. (1)
The distinguishing feature of (1) is the negative effect on patenting brought about
by a rising stock of research. As the stock of past research rises, a decreasing
fraction of new research ideas surpass the quality of previous ideas. Hence a
decreasing fraction of new ideas are patentable. Consider a path of research where
R(i) grows at rate n (i.e., if a constant fraction of human resources are devoted
to research). While the number of ideas grows at rate n, the percentage of those
14ideas that are patentable falls over time. Eventually, i(i) grows at approximately
rate n. Hence the patent-research ratio falls at approximately rate n and the rate
of patenting approaches a constant, Jn. Thus, the patent production function
(1) is consistent with the observation that research has grown while the rate of
patenting displays little trend.
I derive the patent production function below. Since the derivation does not
depend on the form of the search distribution, 1 postpone imposing the Pareto
distribution. In Kortum (1993b), I derive the patent production function under
more general conditions and then test its implications. The empirical findings
support the model's prediction that the rate of patenting is positively related to
current research and negatively related to a proxy for the stock of past research.
4.1.1 Ideas
Remember that an idea is the knowledge of how to produce a good of variety j
andquality Q.Althoughmost ideas are unpatentable, it will be useful to keep
track of all the ideas for producing a given variety. Let I(j,t) be the number of
ideas for variety jthatoccur before time t. The sequence of random variables
{I(j,s)fs0) is a nonhomogenous Poisson process with an arrival rate R(s)/J."
The fraction of varieties for which there have been exactly I ideas by time i is
given by the Poisson density, z(t)'e(')/I!, where 1i(t)J1 JR(s)ds.Note
This result can be derived as the limit of a model where a finite number of researchers have
ideas about a finite number of varieties. For example, imagine R/d researchers and J/d varieties.
A given individual has ideas at rate 1, hence the individual has ideas about a given variety at
rate 1/old) =d/J.Since R/d researchers are generating ideas, the rate at which all researchers
have ideas about a given variety is (R/d)(d/J) =R/J.This result remains true as d becomes
arbitrarily small.
15that Jp(t) is the undepreciated stock of past research.
4.1.2 Patentable Ideas
Ideas are patentable if and only if they are the highest quality in their variety. In
the following argument, I will hold the variety fixed and solve for the expected
number of patentable ideas in that variety conditional on the total number of ideas
in that variety.
I assume that the search process begins at time 0, and that there have been
I ideas prior to time t. Denote the times at which those ideas occurred by, r1 <
r2 < ...<rj, where 0 < r1 and i. Let the qualities of the ideas be
Q,, Q,. . . , Q1, respectively.Since no patents exist before time 0, the first idea
is always patentable. The second idea is patentable if and only if Q,2>Qr1,an
event that occurs with unconditional probability 1/2. Similarly, the Ith draw is
patentable if and only if,
Q,.,>max{Q,.,.. .
anevent that occurs with probability 1/I. The argument above leads to a simple
equation for expected cumulative patents of variety j,N(j,t),conditional on the
number of ideas of variety j,
1
E[N(j,t)I(j,i)=I)=E1/ilnI+1',
where 1, =.5772...is Euler's constant.12
'2There are simple and tight bounds for the expectation formula,
ln(1) <I/i<ln(fl+1
164.1.3 Aggregate Patenting
I define the aggregate stock of patents as the integral over all varieties of the stock
of patents in each variety, N(t) JfN(j,t)dj.13 Conditional on the stock of past
research, Jp(i), the measure of varieties for which exactly I ideas have occured
is proportional to the Poisson density, jt1•But,among the continuum of
varieties for which I ideas have occured, the average number of patentable ideas
will be exactly 1/i. Combining these results we get an equation for the
aggregate stock of patents conditional on the aggregate stock of research,
(t)'e4.) N(i)=J> I!1/i.
I show in appendix A.2 that this equation simplifies considerably when the stock
of research is large,
urn {N(t)— Jln(,u(t))—Ji/.'}=0.
p(1)—.oo
Iwillalwaysassume that t(i)islarge enough so that the error of approximation
may be ignored. Taking time derivatives of the asymptotic approximationabove,
we obtain equation (1) for the rate of patenting, W(i) =
4.2The Productivity Growth Equation
Economists' interest in patent data is ultimately based on the belief that patents
may indicate something about technological changeand productivity growth. Un-
and an asymptotic result,
lim (E[NjI] —InI) =
1—oo
Theseresults are described in more detail in }(ortum (1991).
3Note that while the stock of patents in each variety is an integer, the aggregate stock of
patents is not confined to the integers.
17fortunately, there is little empirical work linking productivity growth to patenting.14
The trends in the data suggest that if such a link exists, it is a proportional rela-
tion between productivity growth and the rate of patenting. Below, I show that
if productivity growth is proportional to the rate of patenting, the representative
search distribution (giving the probability that a new idea will have quality less
than q) must be the Pareto distribution,
F(q) = 1 —
withparameter A < i.' Letting A(t)/A() be productivity growth, I show that,
A(t)/A(t) = A!T(i)/J, (2)
where A is the parameter of the Pareto distribution.
Combining the productivity equation (2) with the patent production function.
(1), and noting that fi(i) = J'R(t), we get an equation relating productivity
growth and growth in the stock of research,
= Aj(t)/p(i). (3)
Equation (3) is the empirical specification traditionally used to quantify the im-
pact of research on productivity [Griliches (1973, 1979)). However, while in the
traditional derivation, A is a parameter of the production function, in the present
derivation it is the parameter of the underlying search distributions. Econometric
estimates of A are generally less than 0.1.
34Kortum and Lach (1994) provide some preliminary estimates using industry level data.
l have imposed an arbitrary normalization so that the lower support of the distribution is
unity. I assume that the original unpatented goods all have unit quality, formally, Q(O,j) =Ifor
j E [0, J]. This implies that the first patent in each variety will raise productivity.
184.2.1 A Productivity Index
The productivity index that I use in this section is the geometric mean of the
quality of goods currently produced. Let the state of the art quality, Z(j, i) of
a good of variety jbethe highest quality of that variety that can currently be
produced: formally, Z(j,i)Q(N(j,t),j). It is well known that in a Bertrand
equilibrium, only goods with state of the art quality will be produced. Therefore,
the productivity index is the geometric mean of the state of the art qualities,
lnA(i)J' I lnZ(j,1)dj. - Jo
Alternatively,I can define a productivity index based on real aggregate output
per worker. In appendix A.3, I show that the twoalternative indices of productiv-
ity grow at the same rate. This is a justification for using the index defined above
which depends only on state of the art qualities.
4.2.2 The Search Distribution
With productivity so defined, constant exponential productivity growth results
from the state of the art quality of each variety rising at a constant rate on av-
erage. If quality improvements areassociated with patents and if the rate of
patenting is constant then on average a patent must represent a percentageim-
provement in quality. I define the percentage improvementin quality made pos-
sible by a patented idea as the inventive step of the patent, denoted asY. In
a search model, as described above, Y is a randomvariable. Some patents will
represent substantial increases in the state of the artwhile others will be minor
improvements. However, the randomness in inventive stepswill average out across
varieties. If the distribution of inventive steps does not change over time, a con-
19stant rate of aggregate productivity growth will result from a constant rate of
patenting.
Since the state of the art within each variety rises stochastically over time,
time stationarity of the inventive step requires a search distribution such that the
implied distribution of the inventive step for new patentable inventions does not
depend on the previous state of the art.
Consider a specific variety of good. Let Qbethe quality of a new idea in
that variety and let x be the previous state of the art in that variety. If the
idea is patentable then Q>zand the patent has an inventive step Y =Q/x.
The distribution of the inventive step for patentable inventions, conditional on the
previous state of the art, is




I want to find conditions on the distribution function, F(.), such that G(ylx) does
not depend on x.
It is convenient to normalize the left support of the distribution function at
unity: formally F(q) >0for q >Iand F(l) =0.This implies, G(yIl) =F(y).




for all x ￿ 1. The unique solution to this functional equation is the Pareto
distribution,
F(y) =G(yx)=I—y'
20for y￿1.16 With the Pareto distribution, the inventive step of patentable ideas
is not only independent of the previous state of the art, it also inherits the Pareto
form of the underlying searcii distribution. Throughout the remainder of the
paper, I assume that the search distribution is Pareto.17
4.2.3 Productivity and Patents
We can now derive an equation for productivity growth as a function of the rate
of patenting. Consider the increase in the log of productivity between time t and
t+ s. Thisincrease is due to the increase in the state of the art qualities of
'1 follow a proof in Billingsley (1986, pg.191)which solves a similar equation to obtain the
exponential distribution. We want a function satisfying, I — = (1—F(x))(I—
Equivalently,we want a function 1f(.) that satisfies H(Inz + my) =H(Inx)H(Iny)where,
H(ln q) =1—F(q). Cauchy's equation implies H(w) =efor some number a. Thus, 1— F(q) =
olii q = qQ,which is the desired result.
17The following are some notes related to the Pareto distribution. The mean of the Pareto dis-
tribution is 1/(1 —A).If the random variable Q has the Pareto distribution, then the distribution
of In Q is,
Pr(tn Q ￿ x) =Pr(Q<ex) =I—
whichis the exponential distribution. In Kortum (1991) I note that only the exponential dis-
tribution has the property that the absolute increase in the state of the art is independent of
the initial state of the art. Now, we have the companion result, that only the log exponential
distribution has the property that the inventive step (defined as a percentage improvement) is
independent of the initial state of the art. The Pareto distribution is used byBental and Peled
(1992) to illustrate their model of endogenous growth based on asearch process. While Scherer
(1965) reports fitting the Pareto distribution to patent values (i.e. private values),the result here
concerns the distribution of social values of patents. The distributionof private values will be
discussed below. To examine the distributional assumption directly, one would want micro data
of the type being studied by Henderson and Cockburn (1993).
21individual varieties,
In A(i + 3)— InA(t) =JI ln(Z(j, i + 3)/Z(j, t))dj. Jo
The increase in the state of the art within variety j, Z(j, i + s)/Z(j, t),isequal to
the product of the inventive steps of any patents on variety j which were discovered
between tandt + s. Let X(k,i,3) be the measure of varieties in which exactly
k E {O, 1,2,. ..} patentsare discovered between t and i + s. Then,
00 k
InA(t + 3)— inA(t) =J(k, i, s)E[ln(ll 1';)].
k=1 i=1
Sincethe Y are drawn from the Pareto distribution, in).'1 is drawn from the ex-






In A(t + s) —inA(t) =J'(k, 1, s)kA =(N(t+ s) —N(t))/J.
Dividing both sides of the equation by s and taking the limit as s goes to zero, we
get equation (2) for productivity growth.
4.3 Equilibrium Research
In the derivations above I have conditioned on a path of research. I can now solve
for an equilibrium path of research. Individuals in the model always have the
choice of being researchers or earning a wage of unity. A researcher has a chance of
22discovering a patentable idea which will yield a stream of future earnings. As long
as a positive measure of individuals choose to be researchers, a given researcher
knows that patentable ideas will arrive to her at a stochastic rate ii(i)/R(t). Our
patent production function (1) implies that this arrival rate is ji(t)1.LetV(t) be
the expected present discounted value of a patentable idea discovered at time t. In
an equilibrium where 0 < R(t) <e'", all individuals must be indifferent between
research and earning a wage of unity, i.e. V(i)(i)' =1or V(i) =
Iwill concentrate on the steady state equilibrium in which a constant fraction
of individuals choose research, R(i)/e" =a.Along the steady state, the stock of
research is given by 4t) =cxe'"/(nJ).It is increasing in a because a larger fraction
of individuals engaged in research leads to a higher stock of past research. Below, I
show that the expected value of a new patent is given by V(t) =(1
—a)Be"twhere
B is a complicated function of several of the parameters of the model. Intuitively,
I'(t) is decreasing in a because in an economy where a large fraction of individuals
are engaged in research, levels of production will be low and hence patentswill
be less profitable. The steady state equilibrium is the unique value of a such that
=V(t).I obtain an expression for a and calculate it numerically for a range
of values of the model's parameters. I conclude the section by comparing a with
the fraction of human resources which a social planner would devote to research.
4.3.1 The Value of a Patent
The value of a patent is the expected presented discounted value of theflow of
profits obtained by selling the patented good. Afirst step in determining the
value of a patent is to calculate this flow of profits. It was noted abovethat in a
Bertrand equilibrium between producers, only state of the art goods areconsumed.
23Given the simple specification of preferences, individuals will distribute expendi-
ture uniformly across all state of the art goods. Let C(j,i)C(N(j,i),j,i) be the
quantity of the state of the art good of variety j and let P(j,i)P(N(j,2),j,t)
be its price. Define aggregate expenditure as X(i)f'P(j,i)C(j,1). Then, we
have P(j, t)C(j, t) =J1X(t).
The producer of a state of the art good faces competition from the producer
of the next highest quality pricing at marginal cost. She maximizes profits by
charging a price of cY where Y is her inventive step. Thus, the flow of profits to
the producer of the state of the art good of variety j is,
P(j,i)C(j,t)[1 —c/P(j,i)]=JX(i)[l
—Y(j,i)],
where, Y(j,i)Z(j,i)/Q(N(j,i) —l,j)is the inventive step of the state of the
art good of variety j. Note that profits depend on the variety, j, via the inventive
step. A patent with a greater inventive step is more valuable because the producer
can maintain a greater markup of price over marginal cost.
Now consider a state of the art patent with an inventive step of y. De-
note the quality of the previous state of the art patent by x. Thus, the state
of the art patent has quality z =xy.This patent generates a flow of profits,
r(1,y) J'X(i)[l —y]at time i. This equation governs its flow of profits un-
til the current state of the art patent is made obsolete by a new pateut with quality
exceeding z. Due to the scope of patent protection, the patent holder does not
see its markup eroded by subsequent unpatentable ideas with qualities between x
and z.
At time i, the discounted future profits from a patent with inventive step y are,
fr" e"(')7r(s,y)ds.This is a random variable because the future profitable life
24of the patent, L, is a random variable. Each patent faces an instantaneous hazard
given by the rate at which new ideas with higher qualities are being discovered.
At time s, ideas on a given variety are produced at rate J'R(s). For a patent
with a state of the art z the fraction of these ideas that are patentable is
Thus, the hazard rate for a patent with state of the art z is J1R(s)z'I', which
is decreasing in z. Combining results, the expected value of a patentable idea at
time i with a state of the art Z = z and inventive step Y = y is,
V(t,; y) = J°°I1(p+J_1R(v)z_1)dh7w(s,y).
The value of a patent depends on time (through its effect on aggregate expenditure
and aggregate research), the inventive step (through its effect on the price which
the producer can charge), and the state of the art (through its effect on the
expected profitable life of the patent). Conditional on these three factors, the
date at which a patent is invented is irrelevant.
For a researcher hoping to discover a patentable idea, the inventive step and
state of the art are random variables. Thus the value of a patent is also a ran-
dom variable, V(i, Z,Y). The expected value of a patent, conditional on it being
discovered at time is,
V(i) = E[V(i,Z,Y)] = jjV(izv)f(z7vIt)dvdz (4)
where f(z, ylt)isthe joint density of the state of the art and inventive step of
patentable ideas discovered at time 1. That density is derived in appendix A.5.
4.3.2 Aggregate Expenditure
The profits from marketing a patentable good are proportional to aggregate ex-
penditure in the economy, X(t). At each instant, the aggregate expenditure on
25goods is equal to aggregate income. Aggregate income consists of wage income
andprofitincome. Since the wage is unity, wage income is equal to the measure of
individuals who are not researchers, e"— R(t).Aggregate profit income is equal






where, 9(t) J' f1' Y(j,i)dj. Therefore, X(i) =e't—R(2)+ X(t) —
orX(t)= (e1't —
Theterm 0(t) is the average value across varieties at time iofthe inverse of
the inventive step. Since there are a continuum of varieties, this average is equal
to the expected value of the inverse of the inventive step, 0(i) =J?°y'92(yIi)dy,
where g2(yjt) is the density of the inventive step for patents which are profitable
at time 1.1derive this density in appendix A.6 and show that it does not depend




where the average inverse inventive step is now denoted by 0(A) to indicate that
it depends only on the parameter A. In the second column of table 1, I use
Mathematica to calculate 0(A) for various values of A.
4.3.3 The Steady State Solution
In order to solve for an equilibrium path of research, I assume that the economy
is in a steady state. I define a steady state to be an equilibrium such that the
fraction of individuals engaged in research is constant, i.e. R(s) =ae'for all
26s ￿ t. Furthermore, I assume that the stock of past research has adjusted to this
steady state: formally J'R(t)/p(i) =n.
First, I calculate V(i) subject to this restriction on the path of research. Sec-
ond, I solve for the value of a which is consistent with equilibrium. In solving for
V(t), there is a complicated interaction between patent values (as a function of z,
y and i) and the joint distribution of the state of the art and the inventive step
(conditional on time) for new patents. This interaction remains complicated even
after applying the steady state results that R(s) and X(s) both grow at rate n.
The derivation of the following equation is found in appendix A.7,
11(t)= ____ — (p/n,A)]=(1_a)etii
—
where,(p/n, A) is a complicated function. Numerical values of ,fordifferent
settings of p/n and A, are shown in table 1.
Two observations can be made which do not depend on the numerical values
of q5. First, the equation for V(t) conditional on X(i) does not depend on the
fraction of individuals who are researchers, a, though X(i) itself is a function of
a. Second, V(t) grows at rate n. This second result comes outof the interaction
(noted above) between the value over time of a patentconditional on Y and Z
and the joint distribution of Y and Z for each new cohort of patents. The value of
any existing patent grows at a rateless than n since, with rising research, existing
patents face increasing hazard rates. Onthe other hand, the marginal distribution
of Z is stochastically increasing over time, since ideas with lower qualities areless
likely to be patentable as the state of the art rises. In a steady state,these two
effects cancel each other.
I can now solve for the fraction of human resources devoted to research.Assume
27that a is strictly between 0 and 1.18 To support 0 < a < 1 as an equilibrium
requires that V(3) = p(3)forall .,￿2. But, since R(s) = ae'' = J1i(s) and
n = we have j(s) = Equating our expressions for V(s) and p(s)
yields,
a/n = (1— a)(1 —(p/n,A))/(9(A)p).




We have found an equilibrium where the number of researchers and the stock
of past research both grow at rate n. According to the patent production function,
equation (I), the rate of patenting in this equilibrium will be Jn. According to the
equation relating productivity growth and patenting, equation (2), productivity
will grow at rate An in this equilibrium.
In table 1, I show numerical calculations of a for various values of the parame-
ters, A and p/n. The fraction of human resources devoted to research is increasing
in the richness of the search distributions (A) and decreasing in the value of the
discount rate relative to population growth.
A natural question for a policy maker is whether the equilibrium value of a
is above or below the value, c, which a social planner would choose. We would
not expect equality since, in the decentralized equilibrium, goods are not sold at
marginal cost. The social planner's problem, worked out in appendix A.10, yields
'8Consider the possibility of a =1.In that case, s> i implies V(s) =0,hence individuals will
not choose research. Therefore, a =Icannot be an equilibrium. Now, consider the possibility
of a =0.In that case V(s) grows at rate n while 'u(s) is constant. Eventually V(s) will exceed
4s) which will causeindividuals to choose research. Therefore a = 0cannot bean equilibrium.
28the simple result that & =n)/p.In table 1, I compare values of a and a
for various values of the parameters. In all cases, the equilibrium leads to over
investment in research.
To gain an intuition for this result, let me begin by debunking an alternative
explanation. Does over investment result from racing behavior (since researchers
are competing for the prize of having the best invention)? The answer must
be 'no' because, within any variety, search is sequential with ideas arriving as
a non homogeneous Poisson process. At each instant, a researcher knows the
probability of making a marginal improvement in quality. Since a researcher earns
profits based on the inventive step of her idea, her payoffs are closely related to
the marginal social value of her idea. The correct intuition for over investment
arises from the general equilibrium effect of markups on the wages of production
workers. Since output is proportional to labor input, if production workers were
paid their marginal product, then aggregate wage income would be sufficient to
purchase aggregate production. In fact, aggregate wage income will purchase only
a fraction 0(A) <1of aggregate production (with the rest puchased with profit
income). Since production workers are under paid, too many individuals choose to
be researchs instead. This is only an intuition since researchers, by not being able
to price discriminate, are also under compensated. In the numerical examples, the
under compensation of production workers is quantitatively more important.
5 Calibration
I have shown that the search model can account for the trends in the data which
are observed in the US and several other technologicallyadvanced countries. In
29this section I take the model literally and look for values of the parameters which
cause the model to make quantitative predictions which are similar to observations
from the US economy from 1957.1989.19 The data and sources are shown in table
2.
I equate R(t) with the number of research and development scientists and
engineers employed in US industry. Since S&E's have increased at an annual rate
of 3.6%, I take n =.036.This is a lower bound on n since it ignores any growth
in human capital per scientist and engineer.
I now consider calibrating productivity growth in the model, A/A =Anbased
on measures of productivity growth in the US. There are a range of valuesof A
implied by different measures. TFP growth in the manufacturing sector has been
2.0% which is also the growth rate of output per hour in the private business
sector. This implies An =.02or A =.55.Alternatively if we use the growth of
TFP in the private business sector, 1.3%, we get A =.36.
Alternatively, we can calibrate A based on the econometric estimates of the
effect of research on productivity growth. As noted earlier, these estimates tend
to be no greater than 0.10. It is well known that these estimates of A imply that
less than 0.5% annual productivity growth can be attributed to research, with the
balance of productivity growth left unexplained [see, Sveikauskas (1989)). The
model developed above can easily be adapted to allow for exogenous productiv-
ity growth. Assume that the cost of production parameter, c, falls exogenously
over time at an exponential rate: c(i) =c(0)e_St.Since c does not show up in
any other equations, this change will have no effect on theother predictions of
19The dataonresearch and development is a consistent series beginning in 1957.
30the model. However, it does create a wedge between the growth of labor pro-
ductivity, as defined in appendix A.3, and the growth of our productivity index.
In particular, labor productivity grows at rate g + A(i)/A(i), where g is exoge-
nous productivity growth and A(i)/A(t) is productivity growth accounted for by
industrial research.20.
I now look at data on the fraction of human resources devoted to research.
The obvious measure is the number of R&D scientists and engineers as a fraction
of US civilian employment. That number has increased from 0.38% in 1957 to
0.61% in 1989. Alternatively, we may interpret the model's prediction to be about
the fraction of human capital devoted to research. If we assume that the wage
per unit of human capital is the same in research and production then we should
look at the ratio of R&D expenditures (which is roughly the compensation of
researchers) to total compensation of employees. This ratio is equal to 3.0% in
1957 and 3.3% in 1989. The fact that the ratio of compensation is higher than the
ratio of employment reflects the fact that researchers have above average skills. I
will take .033 as the appropriate empirical counterpart to the fraction of human
capital devoted to research.
The model's prediction for the fraction of human capital devoted to research,
o, depends on two functions, 0(A)andcts(p/n,A) which I calculate numerically
using Mathematica. Table 1 shows the value of a for a range of parameter values.
If we take A= .36then the model comes closest to fitting the data when the
20This follows from the fact that
—R(t)fl=—inc(t) —E[nY] + inA() —in8(A),
see appendix A.3
31discount rate is the highest, p/n =3(so that p =.11).Yet even then, the model
over predicts the observed value of a by a factor of 4. The situation would be even
worse for larger values of A. The situation would also be worse if we attempted
to fit the fraction of the labor force employed in research (which suggests a is less
than 1%).
Now, consider the values of A implied by econometric estimates. If we take A =
.1then for p =.11we come very close to matching the data. If A =.05,then we can
match the data even for a reasonable value of p/n =2(so that p =.07).The model
tells a story which is consistent with the empirical literature on productivity and
R&D. The observed fraction of human resources devoted to research is small and
this is consistent with productivity growth being primarily exogenous. Possibly
as little as 0.2% annual productivity growth (An =(.05)(.036)0.002) can be
attributed to industrial research.
There is another, more speculative, explanation for the low fraction of human
resources devoted to research. This alternative explanation does not rely on small
values of A. In the model, inventors face only one hazard in appropriating the
benefits of their inventions: the success of subsequent inventors. In reality, in-
ventors face many other hazards, such as imitation, which hamper their ability
to appropriate returns; see Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) and Levin et.
al. (1987). If in reality appropriability is more difficult than is implied by the
model, then it is not surprising that the model over predicts the level of research
investment. Actually modeling this may be difficult because a constant hazard of
imitation will interact in a complicated way with the existing hazard rates which
are not exponential (in the present model, a given patent faces an increasing haz-
ard).
32Data on patent renewels provides some evidence for this view. In countries
with annual patent renewal fees, we observe the rate at which owners of patents
fail to renew their patents. Following a cohort of patents invented in year t, one
can calculate the number of patents which fail to renew in year $+1 divided by
the number of patents which renewed in year a > t. Lanjouw (1993) plots these
hazard rates, averaged over cohorts of German patents. For patents of age 5 or
more, the hazard rates are almost always above 0.1. Data in Palces (1986) indicate
that these high hazard rates are also found in France and the UK.
Below I derive the model's prediction for the hazard rate from a cohort of
patents that are all invented at the same time. For simplicity I assume that the
renewel fees are small enough that their effect on the decision to patent may be
ignored. Furthermore, I assume that the failure to renew marks the age at which
a patent is surpassed by a better patent.2'
Let the random variable L equal the length of the profitable life of a patent.
If the state of the art of the patent is Z =z andthe patent is invented at time i,
Pr(Lxiz,i) = 1—
Toget a prediction of the rate at which patents in a given cohort lose value, we
need to integrate over the density of the state of the art for patents invented in i.
21These assumptions are, at best, approximations. The model implies that there are some
patents with arbitrarily small inventive steps and therefore arbitrarily small values. Thus,for
any given positive renewal fee, some patents with positive valueswill not renew. Putnam (1991)
has a provocative finding from his study of 'patent families' where the same invention is patented
in many countries. While the patents in the different countries face different renewal fees and
presumably have different values, all patents in a given family tend to stop renewing in the same
year. This suggests that it is the arrival of.a better invention that eliminatesthe private value of
the entire patent family.
33I show in appendix A.8 that,
Pr(L ￿ xii)= j Pr(L￿ xlz,t)fi(zIi)dz =1—p(L)/1u(t+ x).
In the steady state equilibrium with the stock of research growing at rate n,
Pr(L ￿ xii)= 1—e'.Thus, patents are expected to drop out of a cohort at
rate n. From the calibration I determined that n =.036.Notice that the model
underpredicts (by at least a factor of 3) the observed hazard rates. I view this as
evidence that the private value of patents is being undercut by imitation, a factor
which is absent in the theoretical model.
6 Conclusion
The progress economists have made in quantifying the economic importance of
research can be attributed to a vast number of empirical studiesof the link be-
tween productivity and research expenditures. The results of those studies suggest
that R&D investments contribute significantly to productivity growth. Yet pro-
ductivity growth remains, to a large extent, unexplained. The current paper is
sympathetic to that conclusion: the set of parameters that are consistent with the
observed growth of research as well as the observed fraction of resources devoted
to research also imply that research investments account for only a small share of
productivity growth.
The present paper is also consistent with the empirical literature in the sense
that it provides an alternative justification for regressing productivity growth on
the growth of the stock of research. The resulting estimate of the elasticity of pro-
ductivity with respect to the stock of research is the parameter of the underlying
Pareto search distributions. This interpretation is valid when the estimates are
34obtained from aggregate data and is probably also valid when the estimates are
obtained from industry data.
Much of the recent empirical work on research and productivity has been done
on firm level data sets [Mairesse and Sassenou (1991) survey this literature]. I
conclude by examining, in the context of the present model, what can be learned
from these firm level regressions. I obtain the provocative result that productivity
growth at the firm level is orthogonal to research at the firm level. Thus, the firm
level regressions of productivity growth on measures of research do not identify
the parameter of the Pareto search distribution.
I define firms as countable sets of researchers. Assume there is a continuum
of such firms indexed by m E [O,M(i)]. At time s firm m consists of Rm() re-
searchers. The firm's value is the value of all the patents invented by researchers
while they were in the firm. The firm's revenues are the receipts from marketing the
varieties on which the firm owns patents. Let Sm(s) be the set of varieties that are
produced by firm m at time tandlet the integer Jm() be the corresponding num-
ber of varieties. I define the productivity index of firm m as the (geometric) average
of the qualities of the varieties it produces, ln Am(t) = Jm()' EJESm(t) ln(Z(j,i)).
Thisindex is only calculated for firms which are currently producing at least one
variety.
How does E[ln Am(t)I{Rm(8))0} depend on the firm's path of research? The
path of research will determine (stochastically) the timingof the firm's patents.
To see how this alters the index of productivity, consider the probability density
of the state of the art for patents which are profitable at time i but were invented
at time st.Inappendix A.9, I show that this density is not a function of s,
the cohort of the patent. In particular E[ln(Z)It] = Aln(p(i)) + )i1' for patents
35discovered at any previous date. This implies that expected productivity growth
for firm m, conditional on its past research, is,
E[ln(Am()/Am(t —1))I{Rm(3))=0] = )tlnCu(t)/au(t — 1)),
where p(i) is the aggregate stock of research. Thus, while productivity growth
is random across firms, it is orthogonal to their paths of research. Returning to
our initial question, the present model predicts a coefficient of zero in a firm level
cross-sectional regression of productivity growth on any measure of research.
Productivity growth for a firm occurs through the introduction of new high
quality goods as well as by the abandonment of old low quality goods. The former
is a consequence of the firm's own research while the latter is due to the research
of other firms. In the present model these forces act at the same rate so that the
productivity growth of a firm does not depend on its own research.
36References
Aghion, P. and Howitt, p. (1992), "A Model of Growth Through Creative De-
struction," Econometrica 60(2): 323-351.
Bental, Benjamin and Peled, Dan (1992), "Endogenous Tedinological Progress
and Growth: A Search Theoretic Approach." mimeo, Technion: Haifa Israel.
Billingsley, p. (1986), Probability and Measure, New York: Wiley.
Caballero, Ricardo 3. and Jaffe, Adam B. (1993), "How High are the Giants'
Shoulders: An Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative
Destruction in a Model of Economic Growth." in NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, pp. 15-86.
Cockburn, lain and R. Henderson. (1993), "Racing to Invest? The Dynamics of
Competition in Ethical Drug Discovery." mimeo, MIT.
Cockburn, lain and R. Henderson. (1994), "Measuring Core Competence?: Evi-
dence from the Pharmaceutical Industry." mimeo, MIT.
Eaton and Kortum (1993), "International Technology Diffusion." mimeo, Boston
University.
Evenson, R. and Y. Kislev (1976). "A Stochastic Model of Applied Research."
Journal of Political Economy 84:265-281.
Evenson, Robert E. (1984). "International Invention: Implications for Technol-
ogy Market Analysis." in R&D, Patents and Productivity, ed. Zvi Griliches.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
37Evenson, Robert E. (1991). "Patent Data by Industry: Evidence for Invention
Potential Exhaustion?" in Technology and Productivity, the Challenge for
Economic Policy, OECD, Paris.
Griliches, Zvi (1973). "Research Expenditures and Growth Accounting." in
B.R. Williams, ed., Science and Technology in Economic Growth, London:
MacMillan, pp. 59-95.
Griliches, Zvi (1979). "Issues in Assessing the Contribution of R&D to Produc-
tivity Growth." Bell Journal of Economics. 10(1): 92-116.
Griliches, Zvi (1990). "Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey."
Journal of Economic Literature. 28:1661-1707.
Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan, Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy, Cambridge:MIT Press, 1991.
Jones, Charles 1., (1993), "Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models."
mimeo, MIT.
Judd, K. (1985), "On the Performance of Patents," Econometrica 53(3): 567-585.
Kortum, Samuel, "R&D, Patents and the Progress of Technology in a Search
Model," Boston University Working Paper17, 1991.
Kortum, Samuel, "Inventions, R&D and Industry Growth," Ph.D. dissertation,
Yale University, 1992.
Kortum, Samuel, (1993a), "Equilibrium R&D and the Decline in the Patent-R&D
Ratio: US Evidence," American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
forthcoming.
38Kortum, Samuel, (1993b), "Can a Search Model Account for the Time Series
Behavior of R&D and Patenting?" mimeo Boston University.
Kortum, S. and Lach, S. (1994), "Do Patents Explain Productivity Growth?"
mimeo, Hebrew University.
Lanjouw, J. (1993). "Patent Protection: of What Value and For How Long?"
NBER Working Paper #4475.
Levin, R. C. et. al. (1987). "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1987(3): 784-
829.
Mairesse, J. and Sassenou, M. (1991). "R&D and Productivity: A Survey of
Econometric Studies and the Firm Level." NBER Working Paper #3666.
Mansfield, Edwin, "Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study," Management
Science, 1986, 52, 173-181.
Mansfield, Edwin, M. Schwartz and S. Wagner (1981). "Imitation Costs and
Patents: An Empirical Study." Economic Journal. 91:907-918.
Miller, Arthur R. and Davis Michael H. (1990) Intellectual Property: Patents,
Trademarks and Copyright in a Nutshell, second edition, St. Paul: West
Publishing.
National Science Foundation (1987, 1990). Research and Development in Indus-
try. Washington, DC.
Nordhaus, W. (1969). "An Economic Theory fo Technological Change." Amen-
can Economic Review. 59:18-28.
39Pakes, A. (1986). "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding
European Patent Stocks." Econorneirica 54(4): 766-784.
Putnam, Jonathan D. (1991). "What Can We Really Learn from the Interna-
tional Patent System?" mimeo, Vassar College.
Reinganum, J. (1989). "The Timing of Innovations: Research, Development and
Diffusion." in R. Schmaiensee and R. D. Wihig ed. Handbook of Industrial
Organization. Elsevier.
Romer,P. (1990). "Endogenous Technological Change." Journal of Political
Economy 98: s71-s102.
Scherer, F. M. "Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of
Patented Inventions." American Economic Review, 1965, 55, 1097-1125.
Sveikauskas, Leo (1989). The Impact of Rsearch and Development on Productivity
Growth. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
2331,Washington, DC.
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Stockof ideas (patentable or not) on variety jby time t.
Stockof patents on varietyj bytime 1.
index of goods (ordered by quality).
Qualityof the ith good of variety j.
40C(i,j,i) Consumption of the ith quality of variety j.
P(i,j, I) Price of the ith quality of variety j.
c Labor requirement equals marginal cost (wage=1).
h E [O,e'") Index of individuals.
n Population growth.
p Discount rate.
R(i) measure of individuals who are researchers.
(= J f R(s)ds): The stock of research.
Euler's constant ( .5772.)
Z(j,t) (= Q(N(j,i),j)): The state of the art in variety j.
C(j, I) Consumption of the state of the art good of variety j.
P(j,t) Price of the state of the art good of variety j.
(= Q(N(j,i),j)/Q(N(j,i) —1,j)):The inventive step.
A(t) Index of productivity, geometric mean quality.
A Parameter of the Pareto distribution.
ir(i,y) Flow profits at ito a patent with inventive step y.
V(i,z,y) Value of a patent with state of art Z = z and inventive step Y = y.
V(s) (= E[V(t,Z,Y)): The expected value of a patent discovered at time i.
X(i) Expenditures at time i.
e Expectedvalue (across varieties) of the inverse inventive step.
Equilibrium fraction of human capital devoted to research.
41A.2 Derivation of the Invention Production Function
I want to prove that




N(i)= 1/i = JE[f(I)],
where, 1(I) = 1/i. Since f(I) is concave and I is a random variable with
mean ji(i),Jensens inequality implies E[f(I)) 1/i, where int(y) is
the largest integer which is less than y. We can also derive a lower bound for
E[f(I)J. For any e >0,
1 —Pr[(1
—E)/i(i)￿ I ￿ (1 + e)jz(t)]
= 1 —Pr[—ep(i) I—j.t ￿e/2(t)]
= Pr(II —iz(t)I ￿eji(L))
wherethe last line follows from Chebyshev's inequality, Thus,
Pr[(1 -￿I ￿ (1 + /1(L)] ￿ 1-(t)2•
Using this result,
1
E[f(I)] ￿ (1 — 1/i.
Now let e = p(i)'/3 and let .z(i) —+oo.We trap E[f(I)] between two quantities,
each of which is becoming arbitrarily close to ln(ji(i)) + .Theapproximation is
quite accurate, even for p(t) as small as 20.
42A.3 An Alternative Productivity Index
Consider a productivity index defined as real output per production worker, [X(i)/P(t)]/[ent —
R(i)].From equation (5) we see that X(t)/[e'"—R(i)] is constant over time. There-
fore, real output per production worker grows at the same rate at which P(t) falls.
The price index, P(s), is the geometric mean, over varieties, of price per unit of
quality,
In P(i) J' jln(P(j,1)/Z(j,t))dj=E[lnP(j,i)]-lnA(i),
where P(j,i) is the price of the state of the art good of variety j.Incalculating
the value of a patent, I show that P(j,L) =cY(j,i).Furthermore, in deriving
aggregate expenditures, I show that the distribution of Y across varieties is sta-
tionary over time. Thus, E[ln P(j,i)] is a constant over time, which proves the
result.
A.4 Derivation of the Productivity-Research Equation
We saw that by combining the patent production function and the productivity-
patent equation we could obtain a function relating productivity to the stock of
research. In this appendix I derive this relation directly. The strategy is to derive
the cross-sectional distribution of the state of the art across varieties as a function
of the stock of research. I then integrate over this distribution to obtain the level
of productivity. In particular,
,00
lnA(i)=J'IlnZ(j,t)dj=JIln(z)gj(zli)dz, Jo J1
where,gj(zi) is the cross sectional density of the state of the art. Below, I derive
that density, g1(zi) =(z(i)/))z_()fAe_p(t)z2 Performing the integration
43and letting p(i) become large,
in A(t) = A ln((t)) + Ag',
or,
A(t) =
which is the desired result.
I now derive the cross-sectional distribution used above. Since the outcome
of search is independent across a continuum of varieties, the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of the state of the art conditional on the aggregate stock of research is
identical to the distribution of the state of the art within a given variety condi-
tional onJ JR(s)ds.The latter can be derived quite easily. The trick is
to condition on the number of ideas (patentable or not) which might have occured
and then to sum over the probability distribution for the number of ideas, which
is Poisson. For an arbitrary variety j,considerz ￿ 1,






Note that Pr(Z(j,i) ￿ z(i)) = 0 for z <1.There is a discontinuity at
z = 1 which corresponds to the probability that no ideas have arrived before time
t.However,the probability of no ideas approaches zero as p(i) becomes large. I
will assume throughout that (t)islarge enough that this issue may be ignored.
44Thus, the density of the state of the art across varieties is,
Thus,
in A(i) =j
Changingthe variable of integration to x =
InA(i)=Aj 1nO.z(i)/x)edz=)tln(i(i))(1
— — Aj in(x)c_xdx.
The following equation is an arbitrarily good approximation for large enough i(t),
lnA(t)=)1nj4t)
—Ajin(z)edx.
TheLaplace transform of —'— int is s1 in s, where 'isEuler's constant. Eval-
uating the Laplace transform at s =1implies,
fln(x)edx =
Thisgives us the desired result that,
lnA(i)= Alnp(i)+AtI'.
A.5 The Joint Density of Z and Y for New Patents
Let W Z/Y denote the random level of the state of the art which a new patent
surpasses. I first derive the density ofW for patents invented in i. The joint
density of W and Y, h(w, yI), is then easily obtained since the inventive step, Y,
is independent of the state of the art surpassed, W. Finally, the joint density of Z
and Y, f(z, ylt),isobtained as the derivative of a certain integral over h(w, yI)•
45Let Qbethe quality of a new idea of a given variety. Conditional on the idea
being patentable, the probability that the state of the art, W, which it exceeds is
less than w is,
Pr(W ￿ wIQ￿W) =Pr(W￿ w,Q ￿ W)/Pr(Q ￿ W)
f'vx_h/A(z(t)/A)x(1)/ei()x'"dx r
j(4i) /))z_(2+X)/Ae()X'dx,
where the second line integrates over all states of the art x, the product of the
probability of surpassing that state of the art and the (approximate for finite ji(i))
measure of varieties with that state of the art. The approximations in the second
and third lines become arbitrarily close as p(i) gets large.
Multiplying the density of the state of the art surpassed by the density of the
inventive step (since the associated random variables are independent),
h(w,ylt) =(p(t)/A)2y_(1)w_(2+e_t'.
The joint distribution of the state of the art and inventive step for a patentable
idea discovered at time i is,
ti i/y
Pr(Z,Y= IIh(w,ylt)dwdy. JIJl
Therefore, the corresponding density is
f(z, yI)= y1h((z/y),y) =
whichis the result we were seeking.
46A.6 The Joint Distribution of Z and Y for Existing Profitable
Patents
To derive the density of the inventive step, I first derive a more complicated object,
the joint distribution, G(z, yI),ofthe state of the art and the inventive step for
patents which are profitable at time 1.Thisjoint distribution can be used to derive
the density of the inventive step (and could also be used to derive various moments
of distribution of patent values).
Start with the joint density, f(z, yls), of the state of the art and the inventive
step for each cohort of patents, s[0, t](thatdensity was derived in appendix
A.5). To derive the joint distribution of the state of the art and the inventive
step of patents which have remained profitable through time i,Iintegrate over all
past cohorts taking into account the probability, thata patent









Thus, D(s) is the fraction of patents from cohort s which are stiU profitablein i
andwhich have state of the art below i and inventive step below .Wecan write,
47D(s) =D1+ D2 where,
g=
















Changingthe variable of integration to x =z(s)(z/y)Iwe obtain,
B1(z) =(A/,i(3))z1(e_I(J)2 —
and,
B2(z)= (A/(s))z1(e_ts(5)hIA — e))A).
Solvingfor D1 under the assumption that ji(s)islarge (so that 0),
rj7 I/A
= J (p(s)/))z_(1+e_14t) dz.
1
Changing the variable of integration to, x =p(i)zh/),and solving,
=(e_s(t_hFA — (t)




Theintegral D3 can be solved in the same way we solved D1,
D3= —
Itis convenient to define,
i(i) + z(s)(' —1).
To solve D4, change the variable of integration to, x =
D4 = —it(s)(c_h( t4))
1/)—
h(p(s))
Using the fact that, lim,()_, e'() =0,
D(s) =D1+ D3+ D4 = — h(.(S))(e
—
Notethat 11(s)/J =fz(s)/p(s),thus our equation for the joint distribution of
the state of the art and the inventive step, evaluated at z and y, is,
G(z,yli)= j L)D(3)d3 = — c1,
where,
—f' ft(s) _[Ø(t)+M(,)(yh/Ai)]zIA_ _((i)4z(s)(vh/_1))vI)d
Jo1t(i)+p(s)(y1" —1)
To derive the marginal cumulative distribution function of the state of the art, we
evaluate the joint distribution function at l =zto get G(z, zit)= (note
49that we derived this same distribution using a different approach in Appendix A.4.)
To obtain the marginal distribution of the inventive step, we evaluate the joint




Jo (i) + 14(3)(yh/A —
and,
=ft
Jo j(t) + u(s)(y'/ —1)
Integrating out the first expression,
C2 = ln(ylPt)/(y1i•\— 1).









Thisdensity has the important property that it does not depend on I.
A.7 The Expected Value of a Newly Discoved Patent
The value of patent with state of the art z and inventive step y is,
V(i, z, y) =
f,'(.+J'R(u)z /")dv (1 —y')X(s)ds.
50We are assuming that the economy is in a steady state, so, X(s) =X(i)e'(')and
—p(i)=(eTt(1_t)
—1)(i).Applying these steady state results and changing




We are actually interested in the expected value of a new invention, where we
integrate over the joint density of the state of the art and the inventive step for
new patents,
V(t) =E[V(,Z,Y)]=
where, from appendix A.5,
f(z,yI) = yg((z/y),yli)= (j(j)/\)2y(1_A)IAz_(2+A)/Ae_()(z/v)_I




'j j e((x/w)+1Y°dzJ (1—y')y(')C''dydw. JnA0 o 1
Bychanging the variable of integration to u = wesimplify the integral over
(t()/w)
J (1— y_1)y(1_A)/Jte_wYlFdy =(A/w)e_L
—Aw'r(1
—
where,r(a, z)f°° es'ds is the incomplete gamma function. By changing
the variable of integration to IL= x+ w we simplify the integral over z,
J e'((x/w) + 1)dx =w'/"e"r(1
—p/n,
Combining these results, and letting i() tend to infinity,
V(t) =j w"r(1—p/n, w)dw— jwP/leLr(1_p/n,w)F(1—X, w)dw.
51Using the identity, fot0_IF(b,t)dt =I'(a+ b)/a, where F(a) is the complete






A.8 The Drop-Out Rate from a Cohort of Patents
We want an expression for,
Pr(Lxii) =jPr(Lxlz,t)fi(zIi)dz,
where1
Pr(L ￿ xIz,i)= 1—
andf1(zt) is the marginal density of the state of the art for patents invented at




Pr(L < xIi)= 1—j(,2(i)/?)z(1)e_2ldz.
Changing the variable of integration tow =p(i+x)z1,and letting —,0,
we get the desired resdt.
52A.9 The Distribution of Z for Surviving Patents, by Cohort
From appendix A.6, D(s) is the fraction of patents from cohort s which are still
profitable in i and which have state of the art below z and inventive step below y.
We were able to show that,
D(s) — —.t(s)(c_?(s))z••IP — —
p(i)
where h(p(s))1i(t) + 4u(s)(yhIA— 1).We want to ignore the distribution of the
inventive step so we evaluate D(s) at y =zi.e. at the maximum value of y,
D(s)I
——
Dividingby the unconditional probability, ji(s)//.t(i),thata patent invented in s
will be alive in i we obtain the distribution function for the state of the art of
patents invented in s which are profitable in t,
e
which has the interesting property that it does not depend on s. In fact, the
corresponding density is gi(zIi), which is derived by a different route in appendix
A.4.
A.1O The Social Planner's Problem
I assume that the social planner's objective is to maximize the utility of the rep-




53Implicit in the utility function is the result that the social planner will only have
state of the art goods produced. The planner's control variable is a =R(i)e',
i.e. the fraction of the labor force devoted to research.
The planner cannot influence the underlying research technology, thus the lev-
els version of equation (3), which is derived in appendix A.4, gives the (geometric)
mean state of the art conditional on the stock of past research. The planner can
determine quantities produced and consumed. She will maximize utility by having
equal quantities produced of each variety. Given the quantity of productionlabor
determined by a choice of ,thisimplies, C(j,i) =(1
—a)e"t/(Jc).Combining
these results, we have, U(t)e"t =ez(i)'(1
—a)e't/(Jc).The state variable is
the stock of research, whose law of motion is, fz(i) =R(t)/J=achlt/J.
Thecurrent value Hamiltonian is, H(i) =U(i)e'+ A(t)1t(t), where A(t) is the
shadow value of research capital. The first order conditions are, A(i) =eji(t)/c
and .Ae'p()1(l —a)&"/(Jc)=pA(t)A(i). The transversality condition
requires that lim3... C"3A(s)ji(s) =0.Combining the first order conditions and
using the fact that in steady state, p(L) =oe't/(Jn),we get the result that,
=An/p.The transversality condition is satisfied if p> (1 + A)n.




























Notes: The numerical calculations are performed using Mathematica.
Remember that a is the equilibrium fraction of the workforce devoted to research,
while a is the social planner's choice.
The transversality condition for the social planner's problem
is violated when A =1and p/n equals either 1.5 or 2.































Successful US Priority Patent Applications (000's) 39.2 58.5 1.3
Sources: Productivity measures are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
S&E's are from the National Science Foundation (1987 and 1990).
R&D expenditure is from the National Science Foundation (1990).
Employment and Compensation are from,
Economic Report of the President (1982 and 1993).
Patents are from ICortum (1993a).
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